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THE FRAUD EXCEPTION TO ERISA'S ANTI-ALIENATION
PROVISION: A PERMISSIBLE EXERCISE OF THE
CHANCELLOR'S POWERS?
INTRODUCTION
In response to the proliferation of private pension plans1 and the lack
of effective regulatory legislation,2 Congress enacted the Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act of 19741 ("ERISA"). ERISA was hailed
for establishing uniformity in the law and providing protective measures4
to ensure that workers receive their promised retirement benefits.5
One such safeguard, section 206(d)(1), provides that funds may not be
"assigned or alienated." 6 Courts have differed over whether an individ-
ual's own pension funds may be alienated when it has been determined
that the individual has been responsible for directly or indirectly deplet-
ing pension plan7 assets through fraudulent activities.8
1. The number of employees participating in private pension plans increased from 4
million in 1940 to over 30 million in 1974. H.R. Rep. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3,
reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4639, 4641. It is estimated that 42
million employees will be participating by 1980. Id. at 4672. "This phenomenal expan-
sion of coverage has been matched by an even more startling accumulation of assets .... "
Id. at 4641. The assets of private pension plans were estimated at over $407 billion in
1980. See Munnell, The Economics of Private Pensions 11 (1982).
2. Prior to the enactment of ERISA, three federal statutes impacted on the area of
employee pension plans: the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §§ 401-404, 501-503
(1982), the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1982), and the Welfare
and Pension Plan Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-309 (repealed 1976). Each was en-
forced by a different department within the federal government. See H.R. Rep. No. 533,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4639, 4641.
For a discussion of the inadequacy of this regulation, see infra notes 23-24 and accompa-
nying text.
3. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982)); see
H.R. Rep. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News 4639, 4640-43. ERISA generally applies to both welfare and pension benefits. See
infra note 7.
4. See H.R. Rep. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 4639, 4641-43.
5. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982).
6. ERISA § 206(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1982).
7. ERISA defines the term "pension plan" as "any plan, fund, or program" which
"provides retirement income to employees, or ... results in a deferral of income by
employees for periods extending to the termination of covered employment or beyond."
29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (1982). A "welfare plan" is any plan that provides medical, sur-
gical or hospital care or benefits, benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability,
death or unemployment, vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs,
day care centers, scholarship funds or prepaid legal services. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)
(1982). The participation and vesting section of ERISA, which includes section 206, does
not apply to all benefit plans described in section 1002. See 29 U.S.C. § 1051 (1982).
Specifically, participation and vesting standards do not apply to employee welfare benefit
plans and individual retirement accounts. See id.; Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency
& Serv., Inc., 108 S. Ct. 2182, 2188-89 (1988) (welfare plan benefits are not protected
from assignment and alienation); Rowland v. Strickland, 362 S.E.2d 892, 893 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1987) (IRA's are excluded from ERISA's anti-alienation protection).
8. Compare Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 856 F.2d 1457,
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Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found an implied
exception to the anti-alienation provision in cases where an individual
directly or indirectly damages a pension plan through fraud.9 Accord-
ingly, the court imposed a constructive trust10 on the pension benefits of
an individual found guilty of embezzling pension funds.1 This result is
consistent with prior decisions of the District of Columbia and Eleventh
Circuits.2 In contrast, the Second and Sixth Circuits have declined to
find such an exception in cases of fraud or criminal wrongdoing, based on
a literal reading of the provision. 3
This dichotomy in views results from a failure to differentiate the un-
derlying factual circumstances of each case. 14 The courts fail to distin-
guish between cases in which an employee indirectly 5 damages a plan
through fraudulent activities and cases in which a fiduciary16 directly
defrauds a pension plan. 7 Recognizing such a distinction is necessary
1462-63 (10th Cir. 1988) (permitting alienation), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 3212 (1989) and
Crawford v. La Boucherie Bernard Ltd., 815 F.2d 117, 121 (D.C. Cir.) (same), cert. de-
nied, 108 S. Ct. 328 (1987) and St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Cox, 752 F.2d 550
(11th Cir. 1985) (same) and Planned Consumer Mktg., Inc. v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 71
N.Y.2d 442, 522 N.E.2d 30, 527 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1988) (same) with United Metal Prods.
Corp. v. National Bank, 811 F.2d 297 (6th Cir. 1987) (prohibiting alienation), cert. dis-
missed, 108 S. Ct. 1494 (1988) and Ellis Nat'l Bank v. Irving Trust Co., 786 F.2d 466 (2d
Cir. 1986) (same) and Vink v. SHV N. Am. Holding Corp., 549 F. Supp. 268 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (same) and Helmsley-Spear, Inc. v. Winter, 74 A.D.2d 195, 426 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1st
Dep't 1980) (same), aff'd, 52 N.Y.2d 984, 419 N.E.2d 1078, 438 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1981).
9. See Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 856 F.2d 1457 (10th Cir.
1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 3212 (1989).
10. Employers or trustees trying to reach the pension funds of dishonest fiduciaries or
employees have generally sought equitable remedies. See id. at 1460-62 (constructive
trust); Crawford v. La Boucherie Bernard Ltd., 815 F.2d 117, 122 (D.C. Cir.) (offset),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 328 (1987); United Metal Prods. Corp. v. Nat'l Bank, 811 F.2d
297, 298 (6th Cir. 1987) (garnishment), cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1494 (1988); Ellis Nat'l
Bank v. Irving Trust Co., 786 F.2d 466, 468 (2d Cir. 1986) (constructive trust); St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Cox, 752 F.2d 550, 551 (1 lth Cir. 1985) (garnishment); Helms-
ley-Spear, Inc. v. Winter, 74 A.D.2d 195, 197, 426 N.Y.S.2d 778, 779 (1st Dep't 1980)
(attachment), aff'd, 52 N.Y.2d 984, 419 N.E.2d 1078, 438 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1981).
11. See Guidry, 856 F.2d at 1460.
12. See Crawford, 815 F.2d at 119-22; St. Paul, 752 F.2d at 551-52.
13. See United Metal Prods., 811 F.2d at 300; Ellis Nat'l Bank, 786 F.2d at 470-72.
14. See infra note 85.
15. An employee misappropriating funds from the employer may negatively impact
on the financial stability of the employer and indirectly on the pension plan. See St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Cox, 752 F.2d 550, 552 (1 1th Cir. 1985). Similarly, where the
employer provides a profit sharing plan, a misappropriation of funds by the employee
would reduce profits and thus indirectly damage the plan.
16. A fiduciary is defined as one who: (1) "exercises any discretionary authority or
discretionary control respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or
control respecting management or disposition of its assets"; (2) "renders investment ad-
vice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or
other property of such plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so"; (3) "has any
discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)
(1982).
17. See infra note 85. Compare United Metal Prods. Corp. v. National Bank, 811
F.2d 297 (6th Cir. 1987) (employee fraud), cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1494 (1988) and
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for a proper resolution of the issue. In cases of fiduciary fraud, two sub-
stantive provisions of ERISA are implicated-section 206, which prohib-
its alienation of funds,'" and section 409, which expressly grants courts
the power to use equitable remedies in cases involving a breach of fiduci-
ary duties.' 9 These provisions conflict where an individual breaches her
fiduciary duty causing damage to the pension plan.2  Accordingly,
courts must read one provision as being subject to an implied excep-
tion.2 This conflict does not occur in cases of employee fraud, however,
because only the anti-alienation provision is at issue.22 Grounding the
analysis in factual distinctions and applying established rules of statutory
construction will produce results consonant with ERISA's design.
This Note attempts to resolve the confusion in the courts over the
proper interpretation of the anti-alienation provision in cases of employee
and fiduciary fraud. Part I of the Note examines the background of ER-
ISA and the specific provisions implicated by recent decisions. Part II
focuses on the court decisions contemplating a fraud exception to the
anti-alienation clause. Part III scrutinizes the differences between cases
involving employee fraud and fiduciary fraud and suggests a different
analysis in each case. This Note concludes that rules of statutory con-
struction and strong policy reasons support an exception to the anti-
alienation provision in cases where a fiduciary defrauds a pension plan.
Where employee fraud is concerned, however, the Note advocates a lit-
eral reading of the anti-alienation provision.
I. BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A. ER ISA
Prior to the enactment of ERISA, many persons who had toiled all
their lives found themselves deprived of pensions in their retirement
years because of inadequate pension plan supervision and a lack of mini-
mum standards to protect plan funds.23 The existing legislation was woe-
Ellis Nat'l Bank v. Irving Trust Co., 786 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1986) (same) and St. Paul Fire
& Marine Ins. Co. v. Cox, 752 F.2d 550 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (same) and Vink v. SHV N. Am.
Holding Corp., 549 F. Supp. 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (same) and Helmsley-Spear, Inc. v.
Winter, 74 A.D.2d 195, 426 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1st Dep't 1980) (same), aff'd, 52 N.Y.2d 984,
419 N.E.2d 1078, 438 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1981) with Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l
Pension Fund, 856 F.2d 1457 (10th Cir. Aug. 24, 1988) (fiduciary fraud), cert. granted,
109 S. Ct. 3212 (1989) and Crawford v. La Boucherie Bernard Ltd., 815 F.2d 117 (D.C.
Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 328 (1987).
18. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1982).
19. See 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1982).
20. See infra note 88.
21. See United States v. Vest, 639 F. Supp. 899, 909 (D. Mass. 1986), aff'd, 813 F.2d
477 (1st Cir. 1987); infra notes 89-90.
22. Employees are not fiduciaries under section 409 and therefore are subject neither
to statutorily imposed duties nor to the equitable remedies conferred by section 409. See
Fremont v. McGraw-Edison Co., 606 F.2d 752, 759 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 445
U.S. 951 (1980).
23. President Nixon's message to Congress on December 8, 1971, symbolized na-
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fully inadequate in the areas of plan vesting, fiduciary standards,
administration, minimum disclosure and reporting provisions, and mini-
mum funding requirements.24
ERISA remedied the inadequacies inherent in the existing legislation
through specific reporting and disclosure requirements, 25 including a
provision for the publishing of annual reports. 26 In addition, ERISA es-
tablished minimum vesting standards, 27 thereby assuring employees non-
forfeitable rights after serving a specified number of years.28 The statute
also strengthened management standards by defining fiduciary duties29
and establishing liability for breaching parties."0 Furthermore, minimum
funding requirements were imposed to prevent funding deficiencies.
31
B. The Anti-Alienation Provision
Further protection is provided by ERISA's anti-alienation provision.32
tional outrage against such losses. See H.R. Rep. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, re-
printed in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4639, 4643. The President stated that
"[w]hen a pension plan is terminated, an employee.., can lose all or a part of the benefits
which he has long been relying on, even if his plan is fully vested .... [E]ven one worker
whose retirement security is destroyed by the termination of a plan is one too many." Id.
In addition, Senator Perkins received "hundreds and hundreds" of letters detailing the
abuses occurring under the existing legislative scheme. See 120 Cong. Rec. 29,193 (1974).
Many retirees complained that they were denied expected benefits for arbitrary and capri-
cious reasons. See id.
24. See supra note 2. Congress enacted the Welfare and Pensions Plan Disclosure
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-309 (repealed 1976) ("WPPDA"), in response to abuses in the
administration and investment of pension funds. See H.R. Rep. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4639, 4641-43. Although the
act provided that an annual plan report be sent to the beneficiaries and participants upon
request, it provided no administrative body to police the plans. See id. at 4641-43. Con-
sequently, employees were responsible for ensuring the soundness of their own plans. See
id. In addition, the legislation was devoid of fiduciary standards. See id. at 4641-43. The
WPPDA was later repealed by ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1031 (1982).
The Labor-Management Relations Act ("LMRA") established guidelines whereby
pension plans were administered jointly by management and labor. See 29 U.S.C. § 186
(1982). The LMRA, however, lacked minimum standards for vesting, funding or fiduci-
ary conduct. See H.R. Rep. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 4639, 4641-43.
The relevant sections of the Internal Revenue Code provided little additional protec-
tion and were basically enacted to raise revenue and to enforce the payment of tax obliga-
tions. See I.R.C. §§ 401-404, 501-503 (1982).
25. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (1982).
26. See id. § 1026.
27. See id. § 1053. Minimum participation requirements were also provided. See id.
§ 1052. No pension plan may deny an employee who has remained in service beyond the
later of his twenty-fifth birthday or one year in service participation in the plan. Id.
§ 1052(a)(1)(A).
28. See id. § 1053(a). A plan will generally satisfy the minimum vesting requirements
"if an employee who has at least 10 years of service has a nonforfeitable right to 100
percent of his accrued benefit derived from employer contributions." Id. § 1053(a)(2)(A).
29. See id. § 1104.
30. See id. § 1109(a).
31. See id. §§ 1081-1086.
32. See id. § 1056(d)(1). Anti-alienation provisions are common to other statutory
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This provision requires that " [e]ach pension plan shall provide that ben-
efits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated. 33
Although there is very little legislative history concerning the purpose of
this provision, 34 courts generally agree that anti-alienation provisions
have been enacted to exempt specified sums from the reach of creditors
to enable the recipient to care for himself and his family.35
Pursuant to the anti-alienation provision, the Treasury Department
promulgated a regulation which explicitly provides "that benefits pro-
vided under the plan may not be anticipated, assigned (either at law or in
equity), alienated or subject to attachment, garnishment, levy, execution
or other legal or equitable process."' 36 The anti-alienation provision has
been interpreted to preclude both voluntary and involuntary transfers of
pension funds.37 In compelling circumstances, however, courts have im-
plied exceptions to the anti-alienation provision.38 One such exception,
the implied domestic relations exception, 39 was later codified and re-
mains the only exception provided for by Congress.
C. Fiduciary Safeguards
Congress enacted ERISA's Fiduciary Responsibility section to prevent
schemes and have interchangeably been called exemption clauses or spendthrift provi-
sions. See infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
33. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1982).
34. See Ellis Nat'l Bank v. Irving Trust Co., 786 F.2d 466, 470 n.5 (2d Cir. 1986)
(citing Northwest Airlines Inc. v. Roemer, 603 F. Supp. 7, 9-10 (D. Minn. 1984)); H.R.
Conf. Rep. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 280, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 4639, 5061. The provision was dealt with briefly in a Conference Commit-
tee comment:
Under the conference substitute, a plan must provide that benefits under the
plan may not be assigned or alienated. However, the plan may provide that
after a benefit is in pay status, there may be a voluntary revocable assignment
(not to exceed 10 percent of any benefit payment) by an employee which is not
for purposes of defraying the administrative costs of the plan. For purposes of
this rule, a garnishment or levy is not to be considered a voluntary assignment.
Id. at 5061.
35. In American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1979), the court
found that the purpose of the anti-alienation provision was to protect a spendthrift em-
ployee "from his own financial improvidence in dealing with third parties." Id. at 124.
The Merry court went on to emphasize that "[t]he provision ... assure[s] that the em-
ployee and his beneficiaries reap the ultimate benefits due upon retirement." Id. Simi-
larly, in Cartledge v. Miller, 457 F. Supp. 1146, 1149-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), the court
concluded that the anti-alienation provision was designed" 'to protect a person and those
dependent upon him from the claim of creditors.'" Id. at 1156 (quoting Brown v.
Brown, 32 Ohio App. 2d 139, 288 N.E.2d 852 (1972) (court's syllabus)).
36. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(b)(1) (codified at 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)-13(b)(1) (1988)).
37. See General Motors Corp. v. Buha, 623 F.2d 455, 460 (6th Cir. 1980); Commer-
cial Mortgage Ins. Inc. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 526 F. Supp. 510, 517-18 (N.D. Tex.
1981).
38. See In re Graham, 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984) (bankruptcy exception); Cody
v. Riecker, 594 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979) (domestic relations exception).
39. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3) (Supp. IV 1986). For a discussion of the judicially implied
domestic relations exception, see infra notes 62-73.
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the "misuse of plan assets, and [to provide participants] with remedies
that would protect the entire plan."'  A pension plan fiduciary occupies
a position of trust which, if violated, would be detrimental to a plan's
financial stability.4 1 Section 409 provides that "[a]ny person who is a
fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the responsibilities,
obligations, or duties [to the plan] ... shall be personally liable to make
good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such
breach."4" It further subjects the breaching fiduciary to such "equitable
or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate." 3 Section 409
attempts to keep plans solvent by compelling dishonest fiduciaries to re-
place plan assets that have been dissipated as a result of a breach of
duty.' Accordingly, common law trust principles have been employed
to redress fiduciary breaches.45
II. INHARMONIOUS APPLICATION
In some areas, application of the anti-alienation provision has been less
than uniform. Specifically, disagreement has arisen over whether there is
a fraud exception to ERISA's anti-alienation provision. One viewpoint
advocates an exception based on other ERISA provisions, the legislative
history, trust law analogies and prior case law in the area of domestic
relations.46 The opposing view suggests that it is inappropriate to rely on
domestic relations cases as support for a fraud exception.47 Moreover, a
literal reading of the statute is consistent with legislative intent and is
necessary to protect the corpus of the pension fund from a multitude of
lawsuits.4a
A. Judicially Implied Exception
1. Statutory Language
ERISA's policy declaration, which was explicitly incorporated into the
40. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 142 (1985).
41. See supra note 15; see, e.g., Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund,
856 F.2d 1457 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 3212 (1989); Crawford v. La
Boucherie Bernard Ltd., 815 F.2d 117, 119-122 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 328
(1987).
42. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1982).
43. Id.
44. See Donovan v. Bierwirth, 754 F.2d 1049, 1055-56 (2d Cir. 1985).
45. See id. at 1055; Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113, 122-23 & n.19 (7th Cir. 1984); infra
notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
46. See Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 856 F.2d 1457, 1460 n.3
(10th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 3212 (1989); Crawford v. La Boucherie Bernard
Ltd., 815 F.2d 117, 119-122 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 328 (1987).
47. See United Metal Prods. Corp. v. National Bank, 811 F.2d 297, 299-300 (6th Cir.
1987), cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1494 (1988); Ellis Nat'l Bank v. Irving Trust Co., 786
F.2d 466, 470-71 (2d Cir. 1986); Vink v. SHV N. Am. Holding Corp., 549 F. Supp. 268,
271-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
48. See United Metal Prods., 811 F.2d at 300; Ellis Nat'l Bank, 786 F.2d at 471; Vink,
549 F. Supp. at 271-73.
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text of the statute, supports a fraud exception. In enacting ERISA, Con-
gress intended to "protect ... the interests of participants in employee
benefit plans and their beneficiaries.., by establishing standards of con-
duct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit
plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready
access to the Federal courts."'4 9
Section 409(a) provides additional support for a fraud exception."
This provision, construed together with ERISA's policy declaration, pro-
vides courts with broad authority to fashion remedies where there has
been a breach of fiduciary duty." Accordingly, courts have found a
fraud exception to ERISA's anti-alienation provision. 2 In the seminal
case finding a fraud exception to ERISA's anti-alienation provision, the
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that protecting a
wrongdoer from the consequences of his own misconduct frustrates the
policy goals expressed in ERISA.53 However, courts finding such an ex-
ception have not distinguished between cases of employee and fiduciary
fraud.54 Although the policy goals apply equally in both cases, section
409 is explicitly limited to fiduciaries.
2. Legislative History
ERISA's legislative history emphasizes the broad equitable authority
courts have to fashion remedies.5 5 Committee reports reveal that Con-
gress intended that the federal courts use the law of trusts and all avail-
able equitable remedies when confronted with a breach of ERISA's
fiduciary standards.5 6 Trust law envisions using the panoply of equitable
49. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1982).
50. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
51. See Donovan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226, 1235 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1040 (1984); Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453, 462 (10th Cir. 1978); Marshall v. Snyder,
572 F.2d 894, 901 (2d Cir. 1978).
52. See Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 856 F.2d 1457, 1460
(10th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 3212 (1989); Crawford v. La Boucherie Bernard
Ltd., 815 F.2d 117, 119-120 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 328 (1987); St. Paul Fire
& Marine Ins. Co. v. Cox, 752 F.2d 550, 552 & n.3. (11th Cir. 1985).
53. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Cox, 752 F.2d 550, 552 (11th Cir. 1985).
"The legislation provides no indication whatsoever that it is intended to protect the em-
ployee against the consequences of his own misdeeds." Id.
54. See, e.g., Guidry, 856 F.2d at 1460; Crawford, 815 F.2d at 119-20.
55. See Guidry, 856 F.2d at 1461; Crawford, 815 F.2d at 119-20.
56. See S. Rep. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 4639, 4871. The Report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare emphasized that "[t]he enforcement provisions have been designed specifically to
provide both the Secretary and participants and beneficiaries with broad remedies for
redressing or preventing violations .... The intent of the committee is to provide the full
range of legal and equitable remedies available in both state and federal courts." Id. The
comments of Senator Harrison Williams further illustrate congressional intent regarding
the applicability of the law of trusts. See 120 Cong. Rec. 29932 (1974) ("The objectives
of these provisions are to make applicable the law of trusts; ... and to provide effective
remedies for breaches of trust.").
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remedies in cases involving breaches of fiduciary duty.5 7 Accordingly,
courts are obliged to enforce the remedy that is the most beneficial to the
participants.58
In cases where the dishonest trustee or fiduciary is insolvent, courts
must choose between accessing the fiduciary's pension funds to satisfy
the civil judgment, or leaving the judgment creditor without a remedy. 59
To avoid leaving a party without a remedy, trust law would compel the
forfeiture of the dishonest trustee's pension funds.' Thus, traditional
trust principles have been applied to ERISA cases involving fiduciary
fraud.61
3. Domestic Relations Analogy
Before Congress codified the domestic relations exception,62 courts
used their inherent equitable authority to imply a domestic relations ex-
57. See Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 856 F.2d 1457, 1461
(10th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 3212 (1989); Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453, 462
(10th Cir. 1978).
58. See Eaves, 587 F.2d at 462; Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 214 (1959).
59. See Guidry, 856 F.2d at 1460; Crawford v. La Boucherie Bernard Ltd., 815 F.2d
117, 121-122 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 328 (1987).
60. See Guidry, 856 F.2d at 1461; Crawford, 815 F.2d at 120. This interpretation of
trust law has been supported by commentators. As Professor Scott emphasized:
[i]f the trustee is also one of the beneficiaries ... the other beneficiaries can
compel him to make good the breach of trust out of his beneficial interest in the
trust property. The defaulting trustee-beneficiary is not entitled to receive his
share of the trust property until he has made good the loss which resulted from
his breach of trust. The other beneficiaries can insist that his interest be im-
pounded to make good the loss; they are entitled to a charge upon his interest to
indemnify them for the loss.
3 A. Scott on Trusts § 257, at 2201 (3d ed. 1967) (footnote omitted). Similarly, Professor
Bogert stated:
If a beneficiary is also a trustee of his own trust, acting for himself and others, it
is elementary that as trustee he owes the beneficiaries a duty to perform the
trust and not violate it, and that if he steals trust funds, or causes damage to the
trust estate in other ways, his share under the trust ... will be taken by the
court in order to make good the loss.
G. Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 191, at 484 (2d ed. 1979).
61. See, e.g., Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 856 F.2d 1457,
1459 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 3212 (1989); Crawford v. La Boucherie
Bernard Ltd., 815 F.2d 117, 121 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 328 (1987); St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Cox, 752 F.2d 550, 551-552 (11th Cir. 1985).
62. The family support exceptions were later codified by Congress in its 1984 amend-
ment to ERISA, which allows exemptions for "qualified domestic relations orders." 29
U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3) (Supp. IV 1986). A qualified domestic relations order includes
any judgment, decree, or order (including approval of a property settlement
agreement) which-
(I) relates to the provision of child support, alimony payments, or marital
property rights to a spouse, former spouse, child, or other dependent of a par-
ticipant, and
(II) is made pursuant to a State domestic relations law (including a commu-
nity property law).
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(b)(ii) (Supp. IV 1986).
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ception to ERISA'S anti-alienation provision. 63 In American Telephone
& Telegraph Co. v. Merry,"4 the Second Circuit found that court-ordered
alimony and child support obligations were implicitly exempted from
alienation and assignment proscriptions.65 Similarly, in Stone v. Stone,66
a district court concluded that an award of a wife's community property
interest in her husband's pension fund did not contravene the anti-aliena-
61tion provision.
Courts that implied an exception to ERISA's anti-alienation provision
in cases involving domestic relations orders relied on four rationales as
the basis for the exception. First, the area of domestic relations has been
traditionally left to the province of the states.68 Second, other statutes
containing anti-alienation provisions69 have been interpreted to allow ex-
63. Given the rationale supporting the domestic relations exception, see infra notes
68-73 and accompanying text, courts and commentators have endorsed the domestic rela-
tions exception. See, e.g., Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 856 F.2d
1457 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 3212 (1989); Crawford v. La Boucherie
Bernard Ltd., 815 F.2d 117 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 328 (1987); United Metal
Prods. Corp. v. National Bank, 811 F.2d 297 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct.
1494 (1988); Ellis Nat'l Bank v. Irving Trust Co., 786 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1986); St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Cox, 752 F.2d 550 (11th Cir. 1985); Vink v. SHV N. Am.
Holding Corp., 549 F. Supp. 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Planned Consumer Mktg., Inc. v.
Coats & Clark, Inc., 71 N.Y.2d 442, 454, 522 N.E.2d 30, 38, 527 N.Y.S.2d 185, 193
(1988); Helmsley-Spear, Inc. v. Winter, 74 A.D.2d 195, 203, 426 N.Y.S.2d 778, 783 (1st
Dep't 1980), aff'd, 52 N.Y.2d 984, 419 N.E.2d 1078, 438 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1981); Note,
Garnishment of ERISA Benefits to Satisfy Family Support Obligations: Achieving Equity
Through Judicial Legislation, 46 Brooklyn L. Rev. 961 (1980).
64. 592 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1979).
65. See id. at 121.
66. 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd, 632 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981).
67. See id. at 93 1.
68. Id. at 925 (quoting Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978)). The
basic police powers of a state, especially the regulation of domestic relations, are not
supplanted by federal legislation "unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Con-
gress." Id.; see Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 383 (1930); American Tel. &
Tel. Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118, 121-22 (2d Cir. 1979); Cartledge v. Miller, 457 F. Supp.
1146, 1154-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
69. See, e.g., Social Security Act § 207, 42 U.S.C. § 407 (1982); Veterans Benefits Act
§ 3101(a), 38 U.S.C. § 3101(a) (1982); Railroad Retirement Act § 12, 45 U.S.C. § 231m
(1982).
Section 207 of the Social Security Act provides:
The right of any person to any future payment under this subchapter shall not
be transferable or assignable, at law or in equity, and none of the moneys paid
or payable or rights existing under this subchapter shall be subject to execution,
levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or to the operation of any
bankruptcy or insolvency law.
42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (19.82).
Section 3101(a) of the Veterans Benefits Act provides:
Payments of benefits due or to become due under any law administered by the
Veterans' Administration shall not be assignable except to the extent specifically
authorized by law, and such payments made to, or on account of, a beneficiary
shall be exempt from taxation, shall be exempt from the claim of creditors, and
shall not be liable to attachment, levy, or seizure by or under any legal or equi-
table process whatever, either before or after receipt by the beneficiary.
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ceptions for domestic relations orders. 70 Third, Congress has shown a
general intent to stem the rising tide of public assistance payments.71
ERISA, in particular, repeatedly refers to protecting beneficiaries and
dependents. 72 Last, amicus briefs filed for the Departments of Labor and
Treasury support an implied exception in domestic relations cases.73
Courts finding a fraud exception have relied on the domestic relations
38 U.S.C. § 3101(a) (1982).
Section 12 of the Railroad Retirement Act provides:
[N]otwithstanding any other law of the United States, or of any State, territory,
or the District of Columbia, no annuity or supplemental annuity shall be assign-
able or be subject to any tax or to garnishment, attachment, or other legal pro-
cess under any circumstances whatsoever, nor shall the payment thereof be
anticipated ....
45 U.S.C. § 231(m)(a) (1982).
70. Courts interpreting statutes with analogous anti-alienation provisions have ex-
cepted domestic relations orders from the statutes' express proscriptions. See Texas Bap-
tist Children's Home v. Corbitt, 321 S.W.2d 610, 614 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) (Section 207
of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (1982), interpreted to exclude support pay-
ments from its restrictions); Hannah v. Hannah, 191 Ga. 134, 11 S.E.2d 779, 782 (1940)
(predecessor of section 3101(a) of the Veteran Benefits Act, 38 U.S.C. § 3101(a) (1982),
interpreted to except alimony payments from the exemption provision); Commonwealth
v. Berfield, 160 Pa. Super. 438, 51 A.2d 523, 525 (1947) (predecessor of section 12 of the
Railroad Retirement Act, 45 U.S.C. § 231(m) (1982), interpreted to except support pay-
ments from its restrictions).
Courts have found that Congress generally does not intend to impede domestic rela-
tions orders when they include exemption clauses in legislation. See American Tel. &
Tel. Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 1979); Cartledge v. Miller, 457 F. Supp.
1146, 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919, 924-925 (N.D. Cal. 1978),
aff'd, 632 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981).
71. In 1974, Congress passed amendments to the Social Security Act that were
"designed to combat increases in welfare payments resulting from an inability to compel
payment of support obligations from solvent but unwilling parents." Hisquierdo v. His-
quierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 587 n.20 (1979) (citing S. Rep. No. 1356, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 42-
43 (1974). The amendments require that the welfare applicant assign to the state any
rights to support from another person. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26)(A) (1982). In addi-
tion, the United States, in its role as employer, has subjected itself to legal process in
order to collect alimony and child support payments from its delinquent employees. See
id. § 659(a). The courts have encouraged the enforcement of domestic relations orders,
notwithstanding anti-alienation provisions, because of congressional concern with rising
welfare charges resulting from those defaulting on support payments. See Hisquierdo,
439 U.S. at 587 n.20; Merry, 592 F.2d at 124-25; Cartledge, 457 F. Supp. at 1157-58;
Social Security Act §§ 451-462, 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-662 (1982). Rejecting an exception to
the anti-alienation provision for domestic relation orders would thwart the congressional
aim in enacting the amendments. See Merry, 592 F.2d at 124-25; Cartledge, 457 F. Supp.
at 1157-58.
72. Throughout ERISA's declaration of policy, references are made to either "em-
ployees and their beneficiaries" or "employees and their dependents." See 29 U.S.C.
§ 1001(a) (1982). It was evident that Congress was concerned with protecting both em-
ployees and their families. See id. § 1001. A domestic relations exception is consistent
with congressional intent to safeguard the future security of an employee's family. See
Merry, 592 F.2d at 124; Cartledge, 457 F. Supp. at 1156.
73. The Treasury and Labor Departments are charged with the enforcement and in-
terpretation of ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1242 (1982); General Motors Corp. v.
Buha, 623 F.2d 455, 461 (6th Cir. 1980); Commercial Mortgage Ins., Inc. v. Citizens
Nat'l Bank, 526 F. Supp. 510, 519 (N.D. Tex. 1981). Although their interpretation is not
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cases to demonstrate that ERISA's anti-alienation provision is not "im-
mutable". These courts have failed, however, to reconcile the fundamen-
tal distinctions between fraud and domestic relations cases.74
B. Literal Statutory Interpretation
Courts refusing to find an implied fraud exception to ERISA's anti-
alienation provision have focused on the underlying rationale of the do-
mestic relations exception. For example, the court in Vink v. SHVNorth
America Holding Corp.75 recognized that although there were strong rea-
sons for implying an exception to the anti-alienation provision in domes-
tic relations cases,76 the same rationale was unpersuasive when
considering cases of employee fraud.77
The first part of the Vink analysis recognizes that, in the absence of
clear congressional intent to the contrary, areas traditionally regulated
under state police powers are not affected by ERISA.78 The court found,
however, that refusing to allow pension funds to be alienated in cases of
employee fraud does not supersede fundamental state police powers.7 9
Second, while recognizing that a family support exception would further
congressional objectives of providing for the well-being and security of
employees and their families, the court found that a fraud exception
would negatively impact on the dependents of "faithless employees" and
may result in their becoming charges of the state.80 Finally, the court
noted that the Labor and Treasury Departments filed briefs in support of
the domestic relations exception.8' In comparison, the Department of
Labor urged the court to prohibit a plan from withholding pension funds
controlling, it is entitled to great weight. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140
(1944).
In both Merry and Cartledge, the Justice Department filed amicus briefs on behalf of
the Departments of Labor and Treasury. See Merry, 592 F.2d at 125; Cartledge, 457 F.
Supp. at 1156 & n.57. The government's posture was that "family support decrees were
not intended to be within the scope of the anti-alienation provisions of ERISA." Car-
tledge, 457 F. Supp. at 1156 (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 10);
see Merry, 592 F.2d at 125.
74. See Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 856 F.2d 1457, 1459
(10th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 3212 (1989); Crawford v. La Boucherie Bernard
Ltd., 815 F.2d 117, 121 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 328 (1987); St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. Cox, 752 F.2d 550, 551-52 (11th Cir. 1985).
75. 549 F. Supp. 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
76. See id. at 271-72; supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id; United Metal Prods. Corp. v. National Bank, 811 F.2d 297, 299 (6th Cir.
1987), cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1494 (1988); Ellis Nat'l Bank v. Irving Trust, 786 F.2d
466, 470 (2d Cir. 1986). But see Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 856
F.2d 1457, 1460 n.3 (10th Cir. 1988) ("the public interest in seeing that theft victims
recover their stolen property is no less fundamental and firmly embedded within the
realm of state police power [than domestic relations law]"), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 3212
(1989).
80. See Vink, 549 F. Supp. at 271-72.
81. See id. at 271-72; supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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from a dishonest employee.8 2
In addition to recognizing the distinction between fraud and domestic
relations cases, these courts focus on two additional arguments to but-
tress their position. First, they argue that the decision to create a fraud
exception should be made by Congress. 3 Second, uncertainty over the
scope of the fraud exception would undermine the stability of pension
plans.8 4 Based on the Vink analysis, rules of statutory construction and
policy grounds, the Second and Sixth Circuits have refused to find an
exception to ERISA's anti-alienation provision.
III. DUAL ANALYSIS
Factual8 5 and statutory 6 differences between cases involving the fraud
82. See id. at 271 (citing Winer v. Edison Bros. Stores Pension Plan, 593 F.2d 307,
310 (8th Cir. 1979)).
83. See United Metal Prods., 811 F.2d at 300; Ellis Nat'l Bank, 786 F.2d at 471-72.
"Whether, as a policy matter, an exemption should be created is a question for legislative
judgment, not judicial inference." United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 559 (1979)
("Only when a literal construction of a statute yields results so manifestly unreasonable
that they could not fairly be attributed to congressional design will an exception to statu-
tory language be judicially implied."). Courts are not responsible for fashioning statutes
to achieve equitable results, but must interpret statutes as they are written. See Anderson
v. Wilson, 289 U.S. 20, 27 (1932).
In United Metal Products, the court found that Congress may have concluded that
stability and security of all pension funds are fundamental goals of ERISA. See United
Metal Prods., 811 F.2d at 300. Similarly, in Vink the court emphasized that, although a
literal interpretation of the anti-alienation provision may lead to inequitable results, Con-
gress made it clear that "the pension benefits of both faithless employees... and faithful
ones are to be protected." Vink, 549 F. Supp. at 273.
84. See Ellis Nat'l Bank, 786 F.2d at 471; Vink, 549 F. Supp. at 273.
In Vink, the court found that allowing an exception in cases of employee fraud would
expose a plan to a "boundless stream of suits and disputes in which companies refuse to
pay pension benefits to allegedly disloyal employees." Id. Courts would then have nu-
merous questions to consider, such as whether the exception would be available to em-
ployers and pension plans, whether the exception should apply to felonies, misdemeanors
and acts of negligence, and whether other exceptions for noncriminal fraud and conver-
sion would be extended. See Ellis Nat'lBank, 786 F.2d at 471; Vink, 549 F. Supp. at 273.
The uncertainty engendered by an employee fraud exception would result in multiple
suits against pension plans. See Vink, 549 F. Supp. at 273. Defending the resultant law-
suits would exhaust plan assets. See Ellis Nat'l Bank, 786 F.2d at 471; Vink, 549 F. Supp.
at 273. This would contravene the express purpose of ERISA: to safeguard the funds of
employees and their beneficiaries and to ensure their availability upon retirement. See 29
U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1982).
85. The disagreement over the implied exception to ERISA's anti-alienation provi-
sion has generally arisen in one of two factual circumstances:
a. Where an employee has defrauded an employer of company funds and the em-
ployer/trustee attempts to utilze the employee's pension funds to satisfy the deficiency.
See United Metal Prods. Corp. v. National Bank, 811 F.2d 297 (6th Cir. 1987), cert.
dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1494 (1988); Ellis Nat'l Bank v. Irving Trust Co., 786 F.2d 466 (2d
Cir. 1986); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Cox, 752 F.2d 550 (1 lth Cir. 1985); Vink v.
SHV N. Am. Holding Corp., 549 F. Supp. 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Helmsley-Spear, Inc. v.
Winter, 74 A.D.2d 195, 426 N.Y.S.2d 778 (Ist Dep't 1980), aff'd, 52 N.Y.2d 984, 419
N.E.2d 1078, 438 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1981).
b. Where afiduciary of the pension plan embezzles directly from the pension fund and
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exception militate against the identical application of the statute in all
cases.87 A proper analysis requires distinguishing between cases involv-
ing fiduciary fraud and those involving employee fraud.
A. Fiduciary Fraud
Cases involving fiduciary fraud implicate two different and conflicting
provisions of ERISA. 8 According to rules of statutory construction,
where two provisions of a statute are at odds, courts are left to reconcile
them in a manner that best achieves legislative goals.89 If they cannot be
reconciled, the last in point of arrangement within the statute must
control.90
Legislative history suggests that an exception to the anti-alienation
provision in cases of fiduciary fraud would best further congressional
goals. 9' ERISA was enacted, in part, to protect employees from adminis-
trative abuses.92 It would be contrary to the congressional scheme to
the employer/union attempts to utilize the fiduciary's pension funds to satisfy the defi-
ciency. See Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 856 F.2d 1457 (10th
Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 3212 (1989); Crawford v. La Boucherie Bernard Ltd.,
815 F.2d 117 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 328 (1987).
86. See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
87. See infra notes 88-89; Note, ERISA-Exceptions to the Anti-Alienation Provision:
Strengthening ERISA's Protection Through a Fraud Amendment, 10 W. New Eng. L.
Rev. 317, 348 (1988) (recognizing factual differences in fraud cases).
88. The two sections are 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1982) and 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (1982).
Section 206(d)(1) provides that pension funds may not be "assigned or alienated," while
section 409(a) provides that a fiduciary who breaches her obligation to a pension fund
shall be subject to the equitable relief that the court deems appropriate. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 1056(d)(1) (1982); id. U.S.C. § 1109(a). These provisions conflict when they are given
their literal meaning and considered in the context of fiduciary fraud. See Guidry v.
Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 856 F.2d 1457 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. granted,
109 S. Ct. 3212 (1989); Crawford v. La Boucherie Bernard Ltd., 815 F.2d 117 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 328 (1987). The question posed is whether a court can
utilize the equitable powers granted under section 409(a) to alienate a fiduciary's pension
funds in contravention of section 206(d)(1).
89. Paice v. Maryland Racing Comm'n, 539 F. Supp. 458, 463 (D. Md. 1982); see
Bailey v. United States, 511 F.2d 540, 546 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
90. See United States v. Girst, 636 F.2d 316, 321, (D.C. Cir.), vacated on other
grounds, 645 F.2d 1014 (1979); Lodge 1858, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Webb,
580 F.2d 496, 510, (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 927 (1978); United States v. Updike,
25 F.2d 746, 747 (D. Neb. 1928), aff'd, 32 F.2d I (8th Cir. 1929), aff'd, 281 U.S. 489
(1930); H. Black, Handbook on the Construction and Interpretation of the Laws § 102,
at 325-26 (1911).
91. See Guidry, 856 F.2d at 1463.
[T]here is no indication in ERISA's statutory language or legislative history
that an unscrupulous trustee should be shielded from the consequences of his
misdeeds. On the contrary, there are repeated references to the goal of promot-
ing stability in the work place by protecting the beneficiaries from potential
misdeeds, negligence, and mismanagement by fiduciaries of benefit plans.
Id.
92. See 120 Cong. Rec. 29,934 (1974) ("The absence of any supervision over these
funds and the lack of minimum standards to safeguard the interests of plan participants
and beneficiaries has over the years led to widespread complaints signaling the need for
remedial legislation." (statement of Sen. Javits)).
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allow a dishonest fiduciary, who has directly defrauded plan funds, to
benefit at the expense of an honest employee.93
In addition, according to accepted principles of statutory interpreta-
tion, the fiduciary responsibility section must control because it occurs
later in the statutory scheme than the anti-alienation provision.94 There-
fore, under either theory of statutory interpretation, equitable remedies
allowed under the fiduciary section of ERISA should be utilized to sat-
isfy a judgment obtained against a dishonest fiduciary. The use of such
equitable remedies would necessarily invoke an exception to the anti-
alienation provision.95
Judicial precedent supports this interpretation. 96 The two cases ad-
dressing fiduciary fraud, Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers National Pension
Fund and Crawford v. La Boucherie Bernard Ltd., found an implied ex-
ception to the anti-alienation provision. 97 Neither court, however, recog-
nized the doctrinal differences between cases involving employee fraud
and those involving fiduciary fraud.98
Although muddying the doctrinal basis for the exception, courts con-
sistently find such an exception in cases of fiduciary fraud. 99 The cir-
cuits, however, disagree whether an implied exception should apply in
cases exclusively involving employee fraud.lm
93. See Guidry, 856 F.2d at 1463.
94. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
95. See Guidry, 856 F.2d at 1460 n.3. The court found that "a narrow exception
applicable only to a trustee-beneficiary who has directly or indirectly damaged the fund
through his fraudulent actions could be relatively easily defined and applied." Id.
96. See Guidry, 856 F.2d at 1457; Crawford v. La Boucherie Bernard Ltd., 815 F.2d
117 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 328 (1987).
97. See Guidry, 856 F.2d at 1459-60; Crawford, 815 F.2d at 121-22.
98. See Guidry, 856 F.2d at 1460 & n.3; Crawford, 815 F.2d at 121-22. The courts
appear bogged down in the doctrinal morass. First, they rely on the equitable authority
expressly conferred by section 409 of the statute to grant an implied exception to the anti-
alienation provision. See Guidry, 856 F.2d at 1459; Crawford, 815 F.2d at 119-22. Next,
they cite St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Cox, 752 F.2d 550 (11th Cir. 1985), with
approval even though that case involves employee fraud, not fiduciary conduct, and
would seemingly not trigger the equitable remedies prescribed by section 409 for cases
involving breaches of fiduciary duties. See Guidry, 856 F.2d at 1459-60; Crawford, 815
F.2d at 121.
Finally, the language of the fraud exception suggested in Guidry, see supra note 95,
would indicate that the court contemplated exceptions not grounded in the equitable
authority granted by section 409. See Guidry, 856 F.2d at 1460 n.3. Suggesting fiduciary
liability for indirectly damaging a pension fund exceeds the liability envisioned by the
statute. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104, 1109(a) (1982). Section 409, read in conjunction with
section 404, provides equitable remedies only when a person has violated her fiduciary
duties with respect to the plan. See id. Providing liability for indirect damage to the plan
would imply a broader exception whereby a "trustee-beneficiary" could be held liable for
breaching her duties in the course of employment, which could be wholly unrelated to
her fiduciary duties with respect to the plan. The scope of this exception is not supported
by a reading of the statute. See id.
99. See Guidry, 856 F.2d at 1457; Crawford, 815 F.2d at 117.
100. Compare United Metal Prods. Corp. v. National Bank, 811 F.2d 297, 300 (6th
Cir. 1987) (prohibiting an implied fraud exception), cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1494
(1988) and Ellis Nat'l Bank v. Irving Trust Co., 786 F.2d 466, 471-72 (2d Cir. 1986)
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B. Employee Fraud
Based on rules of statutory interpretation, ERISA's broad preemption
provision, agency interpretation and recent Supreme Court dictum,
courts should prohibit an implied exception in cases of employee fraud.
An analysis of the anti-alienation provision in cases solely involving
employee fraud does not implicate the clashing of statutory provisions
found when the fraudulent party is a fiduciary.101 Where Congress
makes it clear that pension funds should not be assigned or alienated and
no other terms of the statutory scheme conflict with that reading, courts
should not be free to imply exceptions.10 2
While ERISA's preemption provision °3 would not bar the use of equi-
table principles in cases of fiduciary fraud, the provision would foreclose
the use of equitable remedies in cases of employee fraud."° Courts have
found that a state law10 5 must yield10 6 if it has some impact on 11 7 a pen-
(same) and Vink v. SHV N. Am. Holding Corp., 549 F. Supp. 268, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(same) and Helmsley-Spear, Inc. v. Winter, 74 A.D.2d 195, 197-98, 426 N.Y.S.2d 778,
780 (1st Dep't 1980), aff'd, 52 N.Y.2d 984, 988, 419 N.E.2d 1078, 438 N.Y.S.2d 79
(1981) (same) with St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Cox, 752 F.2d 550, 552 (11th Cir.
1985) (allowing an implied exception).
101. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1982); id. § 1109(a); supra note 88 and accompanying
text.
102. Courts considering whether to imply a fraud exception should begin with the
language of the statute itself. See Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980) ("Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the con-
trary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive."); United Metal Prods.,
811 F.2d at 300; Ellis Natl Bank, 786 F.2d at 471; Vink, 549 F. Supp. at 273.
103. ERISA section 514(a) provides that "the provisions of this subchapter... shall
supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any em-
ployee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) and not exempt under section 1003(b)."
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982). "The term 'State law' includes all laws, decisions, rules,
regulations, or other State action having the effect of law, of any State." 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(c) (1982).
Section 514(b) designates areas of state law which are not preempted by ERISA. See
29 U.S.C. § 1144(b) (1982). Section 514(b)(2)(A) provides that "nothing in this sub-
chapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State
which regulates insurance, banking, or securities." Id. § 1144(b)(2)(A). Similarly, sec-
tion 514(b)(4) precludes preemption of the "applicable criminal law of a State." Id.
§ I144(b)(4). Later, Congress enacted section 514(b)(7) in response to judicial disagree-
ment over the application of the anti-alienation provision to domestic relations orders.
See S. Rep. No. 575, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News 2547, 2565-66. It renders the preemption provision inapplicable to "qualified do-
mestic relations orders." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(7) (Supp. IV 1986).
104. Only state laws are preempted under section 1144. Because section 409 provides
for the use of equitable remedies, state equitable remedies would not be preempted when
redressing breaches of fiduciary duties. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982).
105. Generally, preemption of state law by federal regulation is disfavored unless
"there is... actual conflict between the two schemes of regulation that both cannot stand
in the same area" or there is "evidence of a congressional design to preempt the field."
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1962); see Chicago &
N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317 (1981); Jones v. Rath
Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525-26 (1977); see also Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 203
(1952) (the "exercise of federal supremacy is not to be lightly presumed"). While there
may be "actual conflict" between ERISA and recent decisions implying exceptions to its
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sion plan, even if it is consistent with the congressional purpose.10 8 In
anti-alienation provision, Congress, through the adoption of section 514(a), has evinced
an intent to preempt state regulation in the field of employee benefit plans. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(a) (1982).
106. "[W]hen Congress has 'unmistakenly... ordained,' that its enactments alone are
to regulate a part of commerce, state laws regulating that aspect of commerce must fall."
Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (citation omitted).
107. Courts interpreting ERISA's preemption provision have generally focused on the
statute's "relate to" language and have disagreed as to whether some state regulations
"relate to" employee benefit plans as defined in section 1002 of ERISA. See Mackey v.
Lanier Collections Agency & Serv., Inc., 108 S. Ct. 2182, 2185 (1988) (Georgia statute
that provided for protective treatment of employee welfare plans was preempted); Shaw
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983) (New York anti-discrimination ordi-
nance was preempted); Ellis Nat'l Bank v. Irving Trust Co., 786 F.2d 466, 469 (2d Cir.
1986) (state common law principles of equity were preempted). But see St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. Cox, 752 F.2d 550, 552 n.3 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (state equitable principles
were not preempted); Rebaldo v. Cuomo, 749 F.2d 133, 138-40 (2d Cir. 1984) (section of
state public health law not preempted), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1008 (1985); American Tel.
& Tel. Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118, 123-26 (2d. Cir. 1979) (garnishment order to collect
alimony and child support not preempted). For the language of § 1002, see supra note 7.
In Shaw v. Delta Airlines Inc., the Supreme Court held that a New York anti-discrimi-
nation ordinance was preempted under § 514(a). See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97. The
Court found that "[a] law 'relates to' an employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the
phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan." Id. The Court found,
however, that "[s]ome state actions may affect employee benefit plans in too tenuous,
remote, or peripheral a manner to warrant a finding that the law 'relates to' the plan."
Id. at 100 n.21.
In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985), the
Court found that "[t]he pre-emption provision . . . displace[s] all state laws that fall
within its sphere, even including state laws that are consistent with ERISA's substantive
requirements." Id. at 739.
The consistent theme running through Supreme Court decisions is that section 514(a)
was meant to be a broad provision. As such it should preempt all state laws except those
which are only tangentially related to employee benefit plans. See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 95-
100. In addition, the fact that a state law may be consistent with ERISA's general pur-
pose will not save that law from preemption. See Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 739.
108. See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 95-100; Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 739.
The history of ERISA demonstrates that Congress carefully considered the preemption
question. See Hutchinson & Ifshin, Federal Preemption of State Law Under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 23, 38-44 (1978).
Initially, the House and Senate versions of the preemption provision differed. Compare
120 Cong. Rec. 4717, 4742 (1974) with id. at 4977, 5002. The House version limited the
scope of preemption to those areas of state regulation that relate to reporting, disclosure
and fiduciary duties. See 120 Cong. Rec. at 4742. The Senate version provided that state
law is preempted if it relates to "subject matters regulated by this Act or the Welfare and
Pension Plans Disclosure Act." 120 Cong. Rec. at 5002.
The final version of the preemption provision was developed in conference committee.
See S. Rep. No. 1090, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 383 (1974). The conference report points to
the breadth of the preemption provision as envisioned by committee: "Under the substi-
tute, the provisions of title I are to supersede all State laws that relate to any employee
benefit plan that is established by an employer engaged in or affecting interstate com-
merce or by an employee organization that represents employees engaged in or affecting
interstate commerce." Id.
Similarly, debate in both houses prior to the enactment of the committee version re-
vealed that Congress was cognizant of the scope of the preemption provision. Senator
Harrison Williams, Jr., Chairman of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare,
commented on the breadth of section 514:
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the context of employee fraud, 10 9 not only is there a nexus between state
equitable principles and ERISA pension plans, but the possible litigation
and administrative costs engendered by allowing civil attachment of pen-
sion funds would detrimentally impact on the congressional design of
ERISA.110 Thus, unless Congress expressly implements an exception for
employee fraud, equitable remedies must yield to the anti-alienation
provision. "'
It should be stressed that with the narrow exceptions specified in the bill, the
substantive and enforcement provisions of the conference substitute are in-
tended to preempt the field for Federal regulations, thus eliminating the threat
of conflicting or inconsistent State and local regulation of employee benefit
plans. This principle is intended to apply in its broadest sense to all actions of
State or local governments, or any instrumentality thereof, which have the force
or effect of law.
120 Cong. Rec. 29,933 (1974). Additionally, Congressman John Dent, Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Labor of the House Labor and Education Committee, emphasized:
Finally I wish to make note of what is to many the crowning achievement of
this legislation, the reservation to Federal authority the sole power to regulate
the field of employee benefit plans. With the preemption of the field, we round
out the protection afforded participants by eliminating the threat of conflicting
and inconsistent State and local regulation.
120 Cong. Rec. 29,197 (1974); see also id. at 29,942 (comments of Senator Javits).
109. Three circuit courts have considered the impact of the preemption clause on the
fraud exception. See Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 856 F.2d 1457
(10th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 3212 (1989); Ellis Nat'l Bank v. Irving Trust
Co., 786 F.2d 466, 469 (2d Cir. 1986); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Cox, 752 F.2d
550, 552 n.3 (I lth Cir. 1985). The Ellis court, in dictum, asserted that common law
principles of equity are apparently preempted by ERISA. See Ellis Nat'l Bank, 786 F.2d
at 469.
In Guidry and St. Paul, however, the courts dismissed the preemption issue in a foot-
note, finding that ERISA does not preempt equitable principles. See Guidry, 856 F.2d at
1463 n.7; St. Paul, 752 F.2d at 552 n.3. The courts relied on American Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Merry, 592 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1979) and Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal.
1978) for the proposition that state laws relating to garnishment orders are not pre-
empted by ERISA. See Guidry, 856 F.2d at 1463-64 n.7; St. Paul, 752 F.2d at 552 n.3.
St. Paul overstates the holdings in the domestic relations decisions. See St. Paul, 752
F.2d at 552 n.3. Merry and Stone did not find that ERISA preempts state laws concern-
ing garnishment. See Merry, 592 F.2d at 121; Stone, 450 F. Supp. at 932. Merry and
Stone actually held that ERISA does not preempt state law orders pertaining to domestic
relations. See Merry, 592 F.2d at 121 (state court-ordered family support payments are
impliedly excepted from ERISA's preemption provision); Stone, 450 F. Supp. at 932
(state community property laws are not preempted). This interpretation is consistent
with the principle that domestic relations law is an area traditionally governed by state
law. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1971). The reading urged by the court in
St. Paul would undermine the financial stability of pension plans by exposing pension
plans to garnishment from all judgment creditors and seriously detract from the congres-
sional scheme. See Vink v. SHV N. Am. Holding Corp., 549 F. Supp. 268, 271 (S.D.N.Y.
1982); 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982).
110. See Ellis Nat'l Bank, 786 F.2d at 471-72; Vink, 549 F. Supp. at 273; see also
Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Serv., Inc., 108 S. Ct. 2182, 2192 (1988) (Ken-
nedy, J., dissenting) ("Compliance with the state garnishment procedures subjects the
plan to significant administrative burdens and costs .... [S]uch laws are accordingly pre-
empted.").
111. See Ellis Nat'l Bank, 786 F.2d at 471-72; Vink, 549 F. Supp. at 273. The 98th
Congress and commentators have advocated this result. See Hutchinson & Ifshin, supra
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Similarly, Treasury regulations and agency recommendations support
precluding the use of any equitable means to alienate funds from an ER-
ISA qualified plan.1" 2 A recent Supreme Court decision 13 may fore-
shadow future judicial treatment of this issue. In Mackey v. Lanier
Collections Agency & Service, Inc.," 4 a collection agency sought to gar-
nish an employee welfare fund 1 5 after money judgments were obtained
against fund beneficiaries. In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that ERISA
did not preempt state law garnishment claims against welfare benefit
plans. 16 Since welfare benefit plans are not protected by ERISA's anti-
alienation provision, the Court's holding does not extend to alienation of
pension plans.
In dictum, however, the majority concluded that state court garnish-
ment of ERISA pension plans is precluded by the anti-alienation provi-
sion. 1 17 Moreover, the dissent found that where the plan must act as
garnishee, state law garnishment orders are preempted.1 8 An analysis of
the majority dictum along with the dissent indicates that the full Court
would likely find against the garnishment of pension plans." 9 Accord-
ingly, an implied fraud exception to ERISA's anti-alienation provision
would be prohibited as against an employee.'2 0
note 108, at 38-44; S. Rep. No. 575, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 2547, 2565. Congress passed the Retirement Equity Act partially
in response to judicial confusion concerning the family support exception. See id. When
amending the anti-alienation provision for qualified domestic relations orders, the com-
mittee acknowledged the need for a corresponding change in the preemption clause. See
id. The committee stressed "that conforming changes to the ERISA preemption provi-
sion are necessary to ensure that only those orders that are excepted from the spendthrift
provisions are not preempted by ERISA." Id.
112. See supra notes 36, 73 and accompanying text.
113. Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Serv., Inc., 108 S. Ct. 2182 (1988).
114. Id.
115. See supra note 7.
116. See Mackey, 108 S. Ct. at 2186; see supra note 7. The court also found that a
Georgia statute that protected welfare benefits from state garnishment procedures was
preempted by ERISA. Mackey, 108 S. Ct. at 2185.
117. In reaching this conclusion, the Court focused on the language of the anti-aliena-
tion provision and emphasized that
[w]here Congress intended in ERISA to preclude a particular method of state-
law enforcement of judgments, or extend anti-alienation protection to a particu-
lar type of ERISA plan, it did so expressly in the statute. Specifically, ERISA
§ 206(d)(1) bars (with certain enumerated exceptions) the alienation or assign-
ment of benefits provided for by ERISA pension benefit plans.
Mackey, 108 S. Ct. at 2188 (emphasis in original).
The court went on to state that "when Congress was adopting ERISA, it had before it
a provision to bar the alienation or garnishment of ERISA plan benefits, and chose to
impose that limitation only with respect to ERISA pension benefit plans, and not ERISA
welfare benefit plans." Id. at 2189 (emphasis in original).
118. Id. at 2192 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
119. See id. at 2188, (1988) (dictum); id. at 2192 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
120. See id. at 2188 (dictum); id. at 2192 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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CONCLUSION
Congress has ordained that courts may subject a fiduciary to all equita-
ble relief appropriate to remedy a breach of fiduciary duty. Based on
rules of statutory construction, a narrow implied exception to the anti-
alienation provision is a necessary corollary of ERISA's fiduciary provi-
sions. Such an exception would not inflict significant damage on the
goals of the anti-alienation provision and would further promote the fidu-
ciary conduct envisioned by the drafters of the legislation. In addition,
this conclusion is supported by both courts that have considered the
question.
In cases of employee fraud, however, the ancient equitable principle
that a wrongdoer should not benefit from his misdeeds will have to take a
back seat to statutory proscriptions dictated by Congress. Although
abounding in equitable appeal, an employee fraud exception to ERISA's
anti-alienation provision is contrary to the rules of statutory construc-
tion. Moreover, such an exception would be inconsistent with ERISA's
preemption provision and agency interpretations. Where the court's in-
herent equitable powers will do significant damage to the congressional
scheme, a strict reading of the statute must prevail.
Michael T. Murray
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